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REDUCTION IN FORCE RATIONALE:
TEACHERS "RIFFED" IN LEVY LOSSES
The changing patterns in school financing in the early 1970's1
raised problems and situations for which school districts were neither
prepared nor experienced. One of these was the necessity for reducing
the certificated teaching staff in large numbers, or "reduction in force"
(RIF). Guided by a statutory framework which was not designed for
such a wholesale reduction, but rather was developed to deal with relatively few discharges or nonrenewals, 2 school districts facing repeated special school levy 3 failures resorted to distortion of previously

accepted guidelines and manipulation of the delegation process in
order to effect large scale reductions in force while complying with
statutory guarantees of timely notice.
Following three special school levy failures, the Lake Stevens
School District reduced the number of certificated district personnel
and curtailed its programs. The Lake Stevens Education Association
(LSEA), taking the position that there should be no reduction in staff,
refused to participate in the formulation of criteria for reduction in
force policies; the school board then utilized six criteria suggested earlier by the LSEA for reduction in force. 4 Twenty-seven teachers were
1. For a detailed discussion of school funding in Washington see Andersen, School
Finance in Washington-The Northshore Litigationand Beyond, 50 WASH. L. REV. 853
(1975).
2. See WASH.* REV. CODE §§ 28A.58.450,-.515 (1974); id. § 28A.67.070 (Supp.
1975).
3. - The common or public schools of Washington are funded by local taxes raised
by special school levies and by state and federal funds, as well as by a relatively small
percentage of funds from nontax revenue receipts, nonrevenue receipts, county administered funds, and payments from other districts. The primary source of income is
from state funds and the local levy funds. Local funding used to supplement state
funds is characteristic of American educational philosophy and is accomplished by
special millage levies upon local properties, thus tying the revenue potential of each
district to the valuation of real property within its boundaries. These millage levies,
which are in addition to the ordinary state property taxes and thus "special" levies,
are'authorized by WASH. CONsT. art. 7, § 2, and by WASH. REV. CODE § 84.52.052
(1974). WASH. CONST. art. 7, § 2, requires the approval of 60% of the school district
voters. Such special elections may not be submitted more than twice in any calendar
year; without that approval the district depends entirely upon state aid. See note 44
infra for a discussion of the guaranteed sum per weighted pupil formula from state
funds.
4. Pierce v. Lake Stevens School Dist., 84 Wn. 2d 772, 773-74, 529 P.2d 810, 811
(1974). The six criteria were:
1.That the school district retain as many of the certificated staff as possible under
a curtailed program.
2. That the school district determine the total number of certificated staff leaving
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notified of their nonrenewal prior to April 15, 1972. Pierce and seventeen other nonrenewed teachers brought an action in the Snohomish
County Superior Court to challenge their dismissals. 5 Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's judgment for the defendant school district, and
in 1974 the Washington Supreme Court held that the methods used
by the school district in the nonrenewal of teachers were constitutionally and statutorily valid. 6 In the wake of continued problems in
school funding, coupled with anticipated future special school levy
7
losses forecasting further application of reduction in force concepts,
the relevance of seniority to reduction in force and questions of delegation of authority from school boards to their building administrators for purposes of making nonrenewal decisions have emerged as
salient features of school district management.
The greatest confusion has centered around the term "cause" and
the school district's degree of responsibility in detailing the cause and
the reasons behind a teacher's selection for nonrenewal. Latitude in
the definition of "cause" became the focal point in Washington cases;
"cause" in situations involving lack of funds in school districts is inexorably intertwined with teacher interest in seniority, and with the process applied by building administrators in making their selection of
nonrenewed personnel.
the district for reasons of: retirement, family transfer, normal resignations, discharge or nonrenewal. etc., and that these vacancies be filled from the existing
staff insofar as possible.
3. That the determination of those teachers to be retained (over and above 1-2
listed above) be made primarily on the basis of those qualified to conduct the reduced educational program.
4. That vacant positions be filled by those fully certificated teachers within the
district who have adequate academic preparation and experience fitted to that
particular assignment or who may attain adequate preparation prior to the opening of school in the fall.
5. That seniority be the determining factor when program considerations appear
equal.
6. That within the above framework the building principals shall consider the
following human factors: age. home, special problems, etc.
5. Pierce v. Lake Stevens School Dist., No. 112431 (Wash. Super. Ct., Snohomish
County, Oct. 5, 1972). The action was based on WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.515
(1974), which provides in pertinent part:
In lieu of requesting a hearing before the board of directors or its designated
hearing officer pursuant to the provisions of RCW 28A.58.450 and 28A.67.070.
an employee may elect to appeal the action of the board directly to the superior
court of the county in which the school district is located by serving upon the
clerk of the school board and filing with the clerk of the superior court a notice
of appeal within ten days after receiving the notification of the action of the board.
6. Pierce v. Lake Stevens School Dist., 84 Wn. 2d 772, 529 P.2d 810 (1974).
7. The Seattle School District levy failure in April 1975 raised problems similar
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With its decision in Pierce v. Lake Stevens School District,8 the
state supreme court clarified its position on seniority as a standard in
teacher layoffs and brought the Washington position more into line
with other jurisdictions which have found seniority, absent a statute to
the contrary, to be of equal rather than primary importance with
other considerations. 9 In legitimizing the process utilized by the Lake
Stevens School Board in selection of teachers- for nonrenewal, the
court weakened the statutory safeguards spelled out in R.C.W. tit.
28A in exchange for expediency and administrative convenience, and
as a practical means of handling the multiplicity of nonrenewals resulting from special school levy failures.
In March 1976, motivated by strong public input, continuing failures of the special levies in some of the state's largest districts, and a
general demand for "educational accountability," the Washington legislature passed Substitute House Bill 136410 which amended parts of
R.C.W. tit. 28A and incorporated the Pierce rationale. Thus Pierce,
the first of a line of cases reversing the primacy of seniority as a standard in nonrenewals and allowing critical and sensitive selections to
be determined by administrators instead of the school board itself, was
confirmed by the Washington legislature.
This comment will review the development of due process requirements for teacher reduction in force in Washington, and will consider
the specificity of notice required and the use of seniority as a standard
for nonrenewals. It will examine the adverse impact of the Pierce decision in implicitly upholding the delegation of staff reduction responsibility by schools' boards of directors to individual building personnel,
concluding that seniority no longer holds the preferred position of the
earlier interpretation in Thayer v. Anacortes School District,11 but is
modified by individual district policies and guidelines.
to those found in Pierce. See 1,000 Persons v. Seattle School Dist., No. 795080 (Wash.
Super. Ct., King County, Jan. 28, 1976).
8. 84Wn. 2d 772, 529 P.2d 810 (1974).
9. See generally Williams v. Board of Educ., 263 Ala. 372, 82 So. 2d 549 (1955);
Pickens County Bd. of Educ. v. Keasler, 263 Ala. 231, 32 So. 2d 197 (1955); Unruh
v. Piermont High School, 4 Cal. App. 2d 390, 41 P.2d 212 (1935); Hankenson v.
Board of Educ., 15 Il1. App. 2d 440, 146 N.E.2d 194 (1957); State ex rel. Ging v.
Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1943); Downs v. Board of Educ.,
12 NJ. Misc., 345, 171 A. 528 (1934); Welsko v. School Bd., 383 Pa. 390, 119 A.2d
43 (1956); Walker v. School Dist., 338 Pa. 104, 12 A.2d 46 (1940); Ehret v. School
Dist., 333 Pa. 518, 5 A.2d 188 (1939).
10. Ch. 114, [1975-76] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 327.
11. 8lWn.2d709,504P.2d 1130 (1972).

869

Washington Law Review
I.

Vol. 51: 867, 1976

THE WASHINGTON SYSTEM OF TEACHER
NONRENEWAL

A.

The Statutory Framework

Washington teachers do not have tenure as that term is commonly
applied, but rather operate under a "continuing contract" concept,
and are employed for one year at a time. 12 Contract renewal or nonrenewal is fixed by statute 13 to take place each year on or before April
14
15. Unlike the discharge statute, which may be invoked at any time,
12, WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975) reads in pertinent part:
Every board of directors, unless otherwise specially provided by law, shall:
(1) Employ for not more than one year, and for sufficient cause discharge all
certificated and noncertificated employees, and fix, alter, allow and order paid
their salaries and compensation ....
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent part:
Every board of directors determining that there is probable cause or causes
that the employment contract of an employee should not be renewed by the district for the next ensuing term shall notify that employee in writing on or before
April 15th preceding the commencement of such term of that determination of
the board of directors, which notification shall specify the cause or causes for nonrenewal of contract. Such notice shall be served upon the employee personally or
by certified or registered mail, or by leaving a copy of the notice at the house of
his or her usual abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
resident therein. Every such employee so notified, at his or her request made in
writing and filed with the chairman or secretary of the board of directors of the
district within ten days after receiving such notice, shall be granted opportunity
for hearing to determine whether or not the facts constitute sufficient cause or
causes for nonrenewal of contract. In the request for hearing, the employee may
request either an open or closed hearing. Such board upon receipt of such request shall call the hearing to be held within ten days following the receipt of
such request, and at least three days prior to the date fixed for the hearing shall
notify the employee in writing of the date, time and place of the hearing. The
hearing shall be open or closed as requested by the employee, but if the employee
fails to make such a request, the board or its hearing officer may determine
whether the hearing shall be open or closed ...
.. . If any such notification or opportunity for hearing is not timely given by
the district, the employee entitled thereto shall be conclusively presumed to have
been reemployed by the district for the next ensuing term upon contractual terms
identical with those which would have prevailed if his employment had actually
been renewed by the board of directors for such ensuing term.
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.450 (1974) provides in pertinent part:
Every board of directors determining that there is probable cause or causes
for a teacher, principal, supervisor, superintendent, or other certificated employee.
holding a position as such with the school district, hereinafter referred to as
"employee," to be discharged or otherwise adversely affected in his contract status.
shall notify such employee in writing of its decision, which notification shall
specify the probable cause or causes for such action. ...
In the event any such notice or opportunity for hearing is not timely given by
the district, or in the event cause for discharge or other adverse action is not established by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing, such employee shall
not be discharged or otherwise adversely affected in his contract status for the
causes stated in the original notice for the duration of his or her contract.
If such employee does not request a hearing as provided herein, such employee
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the nonrenewal statute called for notice on or before April 15 of the
current term; the district contemplated no need for the teacher's services the following year but wished the teacher to complete the contractual term. Both discharge and nonrenewal provisions offered substantially the same protection to teachers in the event of an adverse
change in contract status, but the discharge statute was designed to enable school districts to discharge employees for a variety of reasons
which affected teaching ability, such as moral turpitude, drunkenness,
incompetency, or a felony conviction. By this statute, the dismissal
could be effected at any time during the current school year. In comparison, the nonrenewal provisions could be used, as Pierce illustrates,
for reduction in teaching staff due to economic cutbacks. Such was the
statutory framework at the time the facts leading to the Pierce litigation arose.
B.

Notice Requirement: Probable Cause in RIF

In Pierce, the Lake Stevens School District, in a notice properly
5
delivered to Ms. Pierce, stated:'
The failure of this levy has resulted in an insufficiency of funds for the
support of the educational program of the Lake Stevens Public
Schools ...
[T] he School Board is, therefore, confronted with an emergency situation . . . . This has, of course, resulted in determination
by the Board in the reduction of teacher positions.
. . . Lake Stevens School District. . . will not be able to continue
your employment. . . and your employment contract. . . will not be
renewed ....
In holding that this notice did sufficiently "specify'the cause or causes
for nonrenewal"' 6 as required by R.C.W. § 28A.67.070, the court
reasoned that the notice was functionally sufficient, since Pierce still
had an opportunity to ascertain and challenge the specific criteria
7
used to select her for nonrenewal at a hearing.1
may be discharged or otherwise adversely affected as provided in the notice
served upon the employee.
The procedural protections afforded a discharged teacher at the hearing are similar to
those provided in WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975).
15. 84Wn. 2d 772, 774, 529 P.2d 810, 813.
16. Id. at 777, 529 P.2d at 811.
17. The procedure by which a teacher may request a hearing or appeal directly to
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Relying on Perry v. Sindermann,18 the Washington Supreme Court
held that the district need not detail the reasons for nonrenewal beyond a statement of financial necessity. Due process was satisfied if
the teacher could ascertain the reasons in a subsequent hearing or
trial. 19
The court's holding unjustifiably separates concepts of "notice of
nonrenewal" and "cause" and suggests that more exhaustive notice
was "impractical and unnecessary," accepting the notion that the
cause of nonrenewal was the financial need to reduce personnel. Specific criteria will be evolved by school authorities and applied to particular individuals to justify nonrenewal only in the event a hearing is
sought by the teacher. By this reasoning the notice and the hearing
stage become bifurcated units of the complete process, extending the
statutory requirement of cause at the notice stage into the second part
of the process, the hearing or trial, so that the teacher must go to the
second stage to discover the reasons statutorily guaranteed at the notice stage. Instead, the nonrenewed employee should be given the reasons for his or her selection in the nonrenewal process at the initial
superior court from school board action adversely affecting his or her contract status
is set forth in WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.460 (1974).
18. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Sindermann taught for ten years in the Texas state college system; the last four at Odessa Junior College were on a series of one year contracts. No formal tenure system existed, but the official faculty guide contained
language which indicated de facto tenure existed: "The Administration of the College
wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory . . . " Id. at 600. After becoming engaged in public disagreements with the Board of Regents, Sindermann's contract was not renewed by the
board. No reasons were given for nonrenewal, nor was a hearing granted. Sindermann
filed an action in federal district court, alleging violations of first amendment free
speech and 14th amendment procedural due process rights in an expectancy of employment. The Supreme Court rejected the expectancy of employment as a basis
for determining whether or not 14th amendment guarantees applied, but held that
Sindermann should have had the opportunity to prove de facto tenure, thus recognizing that even in the absence of a formal contractual understanding, there may be an
implied right to contract renewal, and concomitant procedural safeguards. The Washington Supreme Court noted that the Court did not hold that the teacher must be
given a detailed statement of the reasons for his nonrenewal. but rather that the
tenured teacher is entitled to a hearing at which he can be informed of the reasons.
For a brief consideration of whether Washington teachers have such an interest in
their jobs that 14th amendment due process protections should be applied see note 62
infra. See also Smith v. Greene, 86 Wn. 2d 363, 545 P.2d 550 (1975). where the
court mentions these issues in the context of denial of tenure to a community college
instructor.
19. The court has since reiterated this position in Hill v. Dayton School Dist.
No. 2, 85 Wn. 2d 204, 532 P.2d 1155 (1975), rev'g 10 Wn. App. 251, 517 P.2d 223
(1973). That portion of Hill relating to the computation of seniority was overruled by
the supreme court in Oak Harbor School Dist. v. Education Ass'n, 86 Wn. 2d 497,
545 P.2d 1197 (1976), insofar as it was inconsistent with the court's interpretation of
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975). See note 50 infra.
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notice stage. Without that specific indication of cause, facing only the
district's generalized financial condition as a reason for nonrenewal,
the teacher cannot adequately prepare for the hearing. The teacher
does not possess sufficient information about the cause to refute or
deny it until the hearing or trial stage. Under these conditions of
vagueness, it is only after the expense of a hearing or trial that the
teacher becomes aware of the reasoning used in the selection process
and is thus finally able to assess the process and organize a challenge
to his or her nonrenewal.
1.

Defects in notice

The current nonrenewal process in the context of economically
compelled staff reductions requires economic necessity, a process of
selection, and a hearing or trial at which time the process of selection
is disclosed to the affected teacher. In Pierce a bare recital of economic necessity for the district sufficed as "notice" for the teacher at
20
the outset rather than a detailed and individualized list of reasons.
In this situation, the reasons for nonrenewal will never be disclosed if
the teacher decides not to go to the hearing or trial stage; thus, the
statutory provision is blunted should the teacher fail to pursue the reasons by utilizing the hearing process. The imposition of the two-step
hurdle imposes a severe financial burden on the affected teacher, requiring the teacher to take the second step to obtain what was statutorily guaranteed in the first step. The nonrenewed teacher is severely
handicapped in challenging the financial difficulties of the school district, for he or she cannot defend against the "cause" given-that the
levy has failed-and is not informed of the role of seniority, age, marital status, sex, competency, or program considerations in the selection
process.
20. The only dissent came from Chiief Justice Hale, who wrote vigorously about
the insufficiency of notice, stating: "Without these specifics [of seniority] the notice,
I think, says nothing." 84 Wn. 2d at 789, 529 P.2d at 820. He found Thayer, see notes
35-41 and accompanying text infra, to be "on all fours with this case," 84 Wn. 2d at
792, 529 P.2d at 821, and discussed seniority as the major basis for teacher retention
or release:
If seniority be not the major factor upon which the right to renewal of contract
depends, then the teacher of this state have no tenure at all in times of reduced
enrollment or curtailed funding.
Either the legislature intended to make seniority the major basis for determining
who would be retained ...

Id. at 795, 529 P.2d at 823.

or they intended nothing more than a trifle.
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Due process standards mandate that the teacher have notice of the
cause of nonrenewal before the hearing, 21 describing the reasons for
nonrenewal selection sufficiently for the teacher to be able to defend
against the charges.2 2 If the teacher does not know the reasons why he
or she was selected and whether the same factors were applied to
other teachers similarly situated, discovery and preparation for the
hearing are severely limited.
The Pierce court hinted at certain reasons other than financial 2 3 in
noting that Ms. Pierce should welcome the kindness of hiding behind
the "financial necessity" security blanket as the reason for nonrenewal. The brevity of the cause "insufficiency of funds"2 4 was called
"an endeavor on the part of the school authorities to be as considerate
as possible of the teacher's interest in having her record free of statements that might be deemed derogatory." 25 The court's statement,
which hinted at dire disclosures damaging to Ms. Pierce's effort to
find another position, 26 suggests that there were reasons other than
monetary which warranted her dismissal. Such suggestions force
teachers to balance the right to specific and detailed accounts of
cause, as provided by statute, with the possible exposure of potentially
dangerous "derogatory statements."
21. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970), was an action
brought by a college instructor alleging that the college terminated his employment
because he had exercised his first amendment rights of freedom of expression and
association. In order to insure procedural due process for the instructor, the court
outlined minimum standards requiring that:
(a) he be advised of the cause or causes for his termination, in sufficient detail
to fairly enable him to show any error that may exist,
(b) he be advised of the names and the nature of the testimony of witnesses
against him,
(c) at a reasonable time after such advice he must be accorded a meaningful
opportunity to be heard in his own defense,
(d) the hearing be before a tribunal that both possesses some academic expertise
and has an apparent impartiality toward the charges.
22. See Griffis & Wilson, Constitutional Rights and Remedies in the Non-Renewal
of A Public School Teacher's Employment Contract, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 549. 569
(1973).
23. 84 Wn. 2d at 778, 529 P.2d at 814.
24. Id. at 774. 529 P.2d at 812.
25. Id. at 778, 529 P.2d at 814. If there are, indeed, those other 'derogatory'
statements, the district might as well have employed WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.450
(1974), the discharge statute. The inconsistency of the court's reasoning is again apparent, since the reflection on the benevolence of school authorities contradicts any
arguments that financial necessity is the cause, and admits the presence of specific underlying reasons for nonrenewal.
26. Many skeptical school teachers would translate that comment about kindness
to mean "Leave the district quietly and we'll give you a usable recommendation:
crowd us and we'll reveal all." Such trade-offs are not uncommon in informal districtteacher 'bargaining.' See notes 69-70 and accompanying text infra.
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The teacher, however, in protecting his or her job interests, is entitled to know the actual reasons for nonrenewal, so that an intelligent
decision may be made whether to appeal the nonrenewal. To have to
proceed to a hearing or a trial in order to discover the cause for nonrenewal defeats the statutory language of R.C.W. § 28A.67.070,
specifying that the cause be provided to the nonrenewed teacher at
the notice stage. Although both R.C.W. § 28A.58.450 and R.C.W. §
28A.67.070 provided procedures for discharge or nonrenewal, the
interpretation of the words "cause" or "causes" as the Pierce court
used them is sufficiently broad and vague that it may present grounds
for constitutional challenge, 27 for the teacher cannot defend against
insufficiency of funds at a hearing or trial. What the teacher needs to
know, prior to the hearing or trial, are those reasons for his or her
selection when funds became limited. The process of administrative

hearing or trial provided by statute is ineffectual unless nonrenewed
teachers know something more than the generalized condition of in-

sufficient funds to sustain district operations. 28

27. In determining if the notice violated 14th amendment due process standards,
the court passed over the initial issue of whether Ms. Pierce had sufficient interest in
her teaching position to insure her right to constitutional procedural protections. Instead, it relied on Sindermann in agreeing that a tenured teacher is entitled to a hearing at which the specific reasons for nonrenewal may be heard. Even if there were a
property interest, since there was sufficient notice, there is, by dicta in Sindermann,
also sufficient protection. In Pierce, the notice was held sufficient, and thus the court
determined that adequate procedural safeguards had been met; thereby avoiding the
question of whether Ms. Pierce had tenure, contractual security, or a property interest
in her employment. Arguably the continuing contract statutory scheme of Washington
is more similar to the de facto tenure scheme of Sindermann than flat one-year contract of the nontenured teacher in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
See note 62 infra. For a discussion of dismissal of college and university tenured
faculty for reasons of financial exigency see Note, 51 IND. LJ. 417 (1976). See also
52 DENVER L. REV. 911, 921-33 (1976).
28. See A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 516 (1974),
where he states in his discussion of governmental controls over teachers and hearing
procedures:
Under the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States, if a teacher insists, he clearly has a constitutional right to a hearing in the following situations:
(1) decertification, (2) dismissal during a contractual term, and (3) dismissal if
tenured. The hearing and the hearing procedures need not be those followed in
a court of law. While variations of detail are permitted among the states in the
three above situations, Supreme Court interpretation of the constitution requires:
(1) that the teacher be given a clear statement of the charges against him and
adequate opportunity to prepare his case; (2) that the standards under which he
has been charged have been made publicly available to him and written in such
a way that a man of ordinary intelligence can understand it, and (3) that a hearing be afforded where the teacher can be represented by a lawyer and have the
opportunity to explain fully his side of the case. Following a hearing the hearing
board must make specific findings of fact based upon the evidence presented during
the hearing, indicating what evidence is relied upon to support which findings of
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Minimal due process at the hearing stage would include the opportunity to confront and examine witnesses before an impartial board.
R.C.W. § 28A.58.515 allowed appeal directly to superior court instead of a hearing before the school board, in either nonrenewal or
discharge proceedings. Recent legislation has restricted that choice by
amending R.C.W. § 28A.58.515, removing the direct appeal to su29
perior court.
2.

Factors in the nonrenewal determination

A wide variety of factors must necessarily affect a school board
decision to reduce the numbers of teachers employed; economic feasibility or desirability as well as determinations of curriculum efficiency
may bring about cutbacks in certain departments or programs. As
long as circumstances justify such a reduction in force, the board may,
even in the absence of statutory authorization in these particular situations, engage in good faith reduction of personnel, including those
with tenure.30 Dismissal of tenured teachers entails good faith nonarfact. If the teacher relies on a constitutional right during the hearing, then that
hearing must be of sufficient scope to allow for the full development of all the
necessary facts and law in order to judge whether that constitutional right exists
in the specific circumstances and whether it has been infringed. Automatic dismissal for exercising a constitutional right is clearly unconstitutional. The overall impartiality and fairness of the hearing are the key considerations.
See also Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Down v. Portsmouth School
Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir.
1970); Jones v. Hopper. 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991
(1970); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.). cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947); Gouge v. Joint School Dist.. 310 F. Supp. 984 (W.D.
Wis. 1970); Griff & Wilson, supra note 22; Seitz, Due Process for Public School
Teachers in Nonrenewal or Discharge Situations, 25 HAST. LJ. 881 (1974); Note.
Constitutional Safeguards for Teachers Employed by Public Education Systems Upon
Dismissal or Disciplinary Actions, 2 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 164 (1973); Note, "Liberty,"
"Property," and Procedural Due Process, 5 CONN. L. REV. 685 (1973); Note. The
Rights of a Non-Tenured Teacher Upon Non-Renewal of His Contract at a State
School, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 702 (1973); Comment, Public School Teachers and the
Limits of Due Process Protection, 61 Ky. L. REV. 830 (1973); Note, Property" Under
Due Process-Non-Tenured Teachers' Rights to Re-Employment, 27 Sw. L.J. 398
(1973).
29. See Part I-C-3 infra.
30. E.g., Woods v. Board of Educ., 259 Ala. 559, 67 So. 2d 840 (1953); Board of
School Trustees v. O'Brien, 190 A.2d 23 (Del. 1963); Bruinsma v. Wyoming Public
Schools, 38 Mich. App. 745, 197 N.W.2d 95 (1972); Nichols v. Board of Educ.. 65
N.J. Super. 45, 166 A.2d 770 (1961); Siniapkin v. Nyquist, 68 Misc. 214, 325 N.Y.S.2d
823 (1971).
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bitrary discretion and judgment by the board. 31 Discontinuation of a
particular kind of service, such as kindergarten, traveling art programs, classes for the mentally retarded, or music classes has been jus32
tified under this approach.
C.

Seniority and Staff Reduction

The pattern in teacher nonrenewal cases in Washington shows a
steady backing away from the importance of seniority in making such

determinations. Although there is no statutory basis for granting seniority in Washington, with the exception of interdistrict moves, 3 3 the

general rule has been that if a school district prescribes guidelines for
nonrenewal which include seniority, then that factor is to be given
some consideration in making such determinations. The question then
becomes one of what weight seniority is to be accorded in nonrenewal
decisions.
1.

The role of seniority
In Pierce, the Lake Stevens School District, in determining which

31. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Roberts v. Lake
Central School Dist. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303
F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Note, Arbitrary and Capricious Abuse of Discretion
in Non-Renewal of Teacher's Contract,8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 131(1971).
32. Fuller v. Berkeley School Dist., 2 Cal. 2d 152, 40 P.2d 831 (1935) (dismissal
of part-time assistant and associate kindergarten teacher is permissible within a statute
authorizing decrease of employees or discontinuation of a particular kind of service
as long as good faith requirements are met); Davis v. Berkeley School Dist., 2 Cal. 2d
770, 40 P.2d 835 (1934) (board may dismiss traveling art teacher when particular
service is discontinued and art taught instead by regular teachers within individual
building); Davis v. Gray, 29 Cal. App. 2d 403, 84 P.2d 534 (1938) (former teacher
and part-time librarian may be dismissed when particular services are discontinued,
but preference must be given to permanent teachers over probationary teachers);
Walsh v. Board of Trustees, 2 Cal. App. 2d 180, 37 P.2d 700 (1935) (dismissal of
vocal music teacher in junior and senior high schools permitted when particular kind
of service is discontinued); Jones v. Holes, 334 Pa. 538, 6 A.2d 102 (1939) (board
may dismiss teacher, even under a tenure statute when teacher's services no longer
needed because of decreased enrollment, as long as not arbitrary, in bad faith, or with
unlawful intent to circumvent the statute); Miller v. Stoudnour, 148 Pa. Super. 567,
26 A.2d 113 (1942) (board may abolish a position in reorganizing science department
for financial reasons; because no charge brought against teacher, no hearing required
as long as no abuse of discretion or political or arbitrary reasons for reorganization or
dismissal); Bates v. Board of Educ., 133 W. Va. 225, 55 S.E.2d 777 (1949) (board
could dispense with teacher's services when teacher/student ratio fell below previously
determined board ratio of one to thirty, as long as dismissal not arbitrary or in bad
faith).
33. See text accompanying notes 12 & 14 supra and notes 41 & 50 infra.
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teachers were to be nonrenewed, stated that seniority 34 was to be the
determinative factor only when program considerations appeared
equal. The litigants challenged relegating seniority to a position of
lesser importance, but the Washington Supreme Court held that seniority need not be made the "controlling factor" in determining
which teachers should be nonrenewed if other factors entered into
considerations, e.g., district program needs and educational qualifications. In arguing for the primacy of seniority as a nonrenewal factor,
the Pierce appellants relied upon an earlier Washington case, Thayer
35
v. Anacortes School District.
The plaintiff in Thayer, after 31 years in the Anacortes School
District, received a letter citing insufficient funds as the reason for
her nonrenewal. Instead of filing for a hearing under R.C.W. §
28.67.070 (now R.C.W. § 28A.67.070), she brought an action in
superior court five months after receiving her nonrenewal letter. She
36
contended the letter of nonrenewal was inadequate and ambiguous,
34. Seniority, in general terms, is employment service credit, computable in a number of different ways, which counts for job preference in evaluation for advancement
or for job retention. Basically, employees with longer service get preference over those
with less service time on the job. Seniority rights are created by statute, by employment practice, or most commonly, by collective bargaining contracts. Once created.
the seniority rights survive the contract which has created them and become analogous
to a property right of the employees. Seniority usually dates from the time employment commences, but does not apply until after the employee has fulfilled some sort
of probationary period.
Washington's statutory framework does not set up tenured teachers as such. but
rather operates as a continuing contract concept. See notes 12-14 and accompanying
text stupra. Length of teaching service does not give the same sort of preferential
treatment as it provides to workers in the labor setting, but it does enter into determinations concerning job retention, building assignments, and teaching schedule as well as
some lesser prerogatives such as parking spaces and avoidance of some more mundane
tasks (e.g., bus loading duty. lunchroom supervision, homeroom duties). These inhouse advantages are determined by individual principals. Under WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975) and the recently enacted Substitute House Bill 1364. Ch. 114,
[ 1975-76] Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 327, all teachers in Washington have the same
employment rights as every other teacher, length of service notwithstanding; teachers
with longer service are not given preference over less experienced teachers, except in
such areas as incremental salary increases, pension rights, leave and the carry-over of
seniority to another district. Thus, in theory, the long-term teacher is as vulnerable to
nonrenewal in April under WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975) and Substitute House Bill 1364, Ch. 114, [1975-76] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 327, as the
newer teacher. The role of seniority in reduction in force, when large numbers of
teachers must be laid off, and the consequent competition for the fewer remaining
positions are new considerations for which there is no statutory answer.
35. 81 Wn. 2d 709, 504 P.2d 1130(1972).
36. The letter read:
This letter will serve to notify you that your contract to teach in the Anacortes
School District for the 1970-1971 school year will not be renewed.
There is no easy way to inform an employee such as yourself that she will no
longer be employed by the school district after the end of this school year. I want
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and "legally insufficient," considering her long service in the district,
arguing that seniority, about which her letter was silent, should have
been an integral factor in determining cause for nonrenewal. 37 The trial
court found that the plaintiffs failure to seek a statutory hearing within
the prescribed ten days barred any remedy. 38 The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that as long as seniority, by the district's own guidelines, was to be a part of the criteria applied in nonrenewal situations, Ms. Thayer's notice was insufficient and defective in
omitting specific reasons for nonrenewal and in failing to indicate the
position of seniority in the circumstances upon which the sufficiency
of the notice was judged. Since the plaintiff was unable to determine
from the notice if seniority was involved, she was under no duty to
39
appeal within ten days.
The court took note of the district's own seniority policy which
stated that "[s] eniority will be the determining factor when program
considerations appear equal ...."-40 and found that plaintiff could
you to know that I and many others do appreciate the service you have rendered
to the children of this community.
We all look forward to the time when the school is fully financed and the education program of the youngsters can again be fully staffed.
Id. at 710, 504 P.2d at 1131.
37. In support she produced a document adopted and distributed by the local
school district board of directors and administrators, which read:
The following criteria will be used as determining factors in reducing staff positions:
1. Normal teacher resignations will not be replaced.
2. Voluntary and qualified teacher retirements will not be replaced.
3. Staff members having emergency certification difficulties will not be rehired
or replaced.
4. Program reductions will be effected in order to reduce positions. (These will
depend on factors 1, 2, and 3 above.)
5. Vacant positions will be filled by those fully certificated teachers within the
district who have adequate academic preparation and experience fitted to that
particular assignment or who may attain adequate preparation prior to the opening of school in the fall.
6. Seniority will be the determiningfactor when program considerationsappear
equal.
Id. at 711, 504 P.2d at.1131-32 (emphasis added by the court).
38. Id. at 712, 504 P.2d at 1132.
39. Id. at 715, 504 P.2d at 1134. The court, in holding that seniority was an integral part of the nonrenewal calculation, found that Thayer could "rightly assume...
that teachers and librarians junior in tenure to her would be laid off first.. " Id. at
715, 504 P.2d at 1134. The court also stated:
Since the notice did not inform her that she was being dropped while junior librarians were being retained, she was not, under RCW 28.67.070, given reasonably adequate notice of the reasons for her nonrenewal.
Id., 504 P.2d at 1134.
40. "Policy Statement Concerning Reduction of Staff in the Anacortes School District in the Case of Levy Failure, February 11, 1969," Id. at 711, 504 P.2d at 1132.
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rightly assume that she would not be dismissed before teachers with
less seniority, based in part on the authority of the school district's
41
own policy for layoffs due to levy failures.
Thayer, while juggling seniority as well as other factors, accepted
the necessity for inclusion of those factors; Pierce posits nonrenewal
on a statement of financial necessity alone. The Pierce court rejected
the appellant's interpretation of Thayer and instead suggested that a
better analysis was available from Peters v. South Kitsap School District,42 where a balance of seniority, district needs, and teacher quali-

fications were all considered in determining teacher placement. Senior41. The Thayer court also interprets WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975)
as compelling the district to "take into consideration and allow credit for seniority in
81 Wn. 2d 709. 717, 504 P.2d 1130, 1134.
making reduction in its personnel .
The statute states:
When any teacher or other certificated employee leaves one school district
within the state and commences employment with another school district within
the state, he shall retain the same seniority, leave benefits and other benefits that
he had in his previous position ...
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975). This is not quite the same thing as
suggesting that the Washington statute was "affording her [Thayer] preferential rights
to renewal of her contract as a school librarian, based on her years of continuous
service as a certificated teacher and librarian within the Anacortes school system."
81 Wn. 2d at 717, 504 P.2d at 1135. There is no indication that she intended to transfer to another district within the state. The court reasoned that if seniority were
relevant to interdistrict transfers, it should also be a factor of some importance in
teacher nonrenewals within a district. As a practical matter the statutory purpose of
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975) was to give a measure of security to
teachers with some experience who sought employment in another district. A sort of
rule of thumb in teaching prior to the enactment of id. § 28A.58.100 was that one
should make career moves within the first four years and find a district in which to
settle down, because after that time, the loss of money involved in moving up the
salary schedule in one district, and then starting again at the bottom of the schedule
in the new district, was too costly. As a consequence, teachers either made decisions
within four or five years, or found themselves caught for financial reasons in a district
which was no longer their choice for other considerations. The author's personal experience involved just such a move after four years in one district. To provide teachers
some freedom of movement then, the guarantee of "traveling" seniority was adopted
in the statute. But none of that would indicate that seniority must be a feature within
a district's consideration of nonrenewal; yet the Thayer court held that under id. §
28A.67.070. the district must delineate in its nonrenewal notice the status of seniority
as it applied to Ms. Thayer.
42. 8 Wn. App. 809, 509 P.2d 67 (1973). Peters suggested that the district had
assigned him to study hall so that he could later be nonrenewed when a reason such
as financial necessity arose. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the bad faith-due
process argument and found the financial problems of the district to be sufficient cause
for nonrenewal. Considering the central issue of the case to be the responsibility of
the district to its nonrenewed employee relative to vacancies occurring before the expiration of his contract, the court found that Peters' continuing contract rights under
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975) were protected and affirmed the lower
court, holding that the district's action in arranging its curriculum and program needs
for financial reduction was made in good faith and did not hinder Peters' qualification
for any new jobs which might open up.
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ity thereby operates as one of several salient issues rather than the
43
controlling one.
Peters illustrates the possibilities latent in nonrenewal where cause
is not adequately detailed, and where factfinding and information
gathering within a school building may well result in personal factors
assuming disproportionate importance in nonrenewal situations.
Peters, at the time of his nonrenewal, was a study hall teacher, although he was qualified to teach in three other academic areas. After a
loss of funds from state per pupil support, 44 the district was forced to
45
reduce its operating budget. Peters was selected for nonrenewal.
Since "a notice of probable cause which specifies as the cause of nonrenewal the financial condition of the district is sufficient to meet due
process," 4 6 no other statement of cause other than the saving of
$7,250 through elimination of the study hall program was found necessary to satisfy the requirements of R.C.W. § 28A.67.070.
Shortly after the Pierce decision, the court again was confronted
43. 84 Wn. 2d at 785, 529 P.2d at 817-18.
44. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 28A.41 (1974), as amended, id. §§ 28A.41.130, 160
(Supp. 1975) pertains to school district reimbursement programs. Under id. §
28A.41.130 (Supp. 1975) the superintendent of public instruction distributes annually
to each school district money which constitutes an equal guarantee of dollars for each
weighted pupil enrolled, based on a school year of 180 days. Id. § 28A.41.140 (1974)
develops the actual weighting formula, which guarantees a specific amount of money
for each district from state funds, regardless of the particular economic base" of the
district. Thus, both "poor" and "rich" districts receive some matching monies. The
weighted formula considers the number of vocational class hours, faculty experience
level, numbers of students in secondary programs, school district size, transportation
problems stemming from remoteness, and federal impacting. Despite variation in the
district's assessed valuation, each district receives the same number of dollars per
weighted pupil, but the weighting factors themselves affect the matching fund amounts.
For example, under the weighting formula, more monies are received per pupil for
a staff which is better professionally prepared. Any enrollment decrease in a district
or population shift in a geographic area will change the amount secured from the
state matching funds. See WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF REVENUE, 1975 TAX REFERENCE
MANUAL 120-27 (1975).
There has been a gradual decline in the percentage of state monies to school districts over the past decade, with the state monies now comprising a smaller percentage
of the total district income than before. This places a greater burden on the special
school levies, which must raise a larger share of the district financial package. For a
detailed discussion of school district financing in Washington see Andersen, School
Finance in Washington-The Northshore Litigation and Beyond, 50 WASH. L. REV.
853 (1975).
45. Peters was the only certified teacher on a full-time study hall assignment.
46. 84 Wn. 2d at 779, 529 P.2d at 814. The central question in Peters involved
district responsibility for reporting new vacancies to the nonrenewed personnel who
were still teaching until the end of their contractual period. The district had no need
to dismiss a teacher with less seniority in favor of Peters as long as there were other
significant program considerations, such as the saving of money to be realized from
discontinuation of the study hall program.
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with the question of seniority standards in the nonrenewal setting in
Hill v. Dayton School District No. 2.47 The underlying problem again
was a levy failure, with resulting loss of funds. The nonrenewal notice
to the plaintiff teacher read: "Due to the decrease in enrollment in our
school and due to the lack of funds because of levy failure, your position . . . must be eliminated for next year." 48 Like Ms. Pierce, the
plaintiff appealed directly to superior court under R.C.W. §
28A.58.515.
The opinion of the trial court ordering the teacher's reinstatement
on the grounds that a bare notice was inadequate was affirmed by the
court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that under
Thayer seniority must be considered only if seniority had previously
49
been part of the district guidelines for reduction in force situations.
The court stated it is not to be considered in every instance where
such reduction is necessary, but only in that particular circumstance
of economic necessity coupled with previous district guidelines. Thus,
the court placed a narrow and limited interpretation upon the utility
50
of seniority.
47. 85 Wn. 2d 204, 532 P.2d 1154 (1975), rev'g 10 Wn. App. 251. 517 P.2d 223
(1973). But see note 50 infra.
48. 85 Wn. 2d at 205, 532 P.2d at 1155.
49.
Id. at 206, 532 P.2d at 1155.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975) was analyzed again by the
Washington Supreme Court in Oak Harbor School Dist. v. Education Ass'n. 86 Wn. 2d
497, 545 P.2d 1197 (1976), in which a levy failure followed by nonrenewal notices
based on a negotiated policy between the board and the education association raised
seniority computational questions. The district sought a declaratory judgment to determine if WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975) required computation of
seniority on total service within the state or total continuous service within the district, or whether the policy negotiated between the board and the association relying
on seniority within the district was controlling. The statutory provision involved was
id. § 28A.58.100(2)(h) which reads:
When any teacher or other certificated employee leaves one school district within the state and commences employment with another school district within the
state, he shall retain the same seniority, leave benefits and other benefits that he
had in his previous position. If the school district to which the person transfers
has a different system for computing seniority, leave benefits, and other benefits,
then the employee shall be granted the same seniority, leave benefits and other
benefits as a person in that district who has similar occupational status and total
years of service.
Affirming the superior court decision that seniority was properly computed upon
total years of service within the state, continuous or not, the Washington Supreme
Court noted that id. § 28A.58.100 does not require that seniority be considered at all
in nonrenewal, but that if it is used, it must be the same for all teachers with similar
occupational status and total years of service. Hill was repudiated on narrow grounds
to the extent that it was inconsistent with the Oak Harbor interpretation requiring
the use of total state service time in computing seniority. Individual district latitude
is acceptable in policy development so long as it conforms to the total years of service
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The court, relying squarely on Pierce, reiterated that the notice of
nonrenewal based on financial considerations alone was sufficient as
long as the plaintiff had the opportunity to request a hearing or appeal
directly to superior court. The court reasoned that this afforded ample
chance for elucidation and particularization of the specific causes.
Again, as in Pierce, the court was careful to close any doors which
Thayer might be interpreted to have kept open for the primacy of seniority as a determinant in reductions in force. By this decision, the
court ratified the functional "cause" in the sparse wording of the
Pierce notice, "insufficiency of funds." 51
2.

Defining nonrenewal criteria

Seniority should not be the sole consideration in any kind of employee retention assessment, nor should any other single criterion
carry such weight. Although a certain educational expertise may accrue from years of experience, it is unrealistic to assert that length of
service alone produces benefits sufficient to make the service time of
greater significance than merit, ability, program priority, or affirmative action concepts. Ideally, a teacher's worth to the district, his or her
relationship to students, and the amount of enthusiasm generated are
all relatively measurable components and should be included as important considerations in nonrenewal situations. Years of classroom
experience do not necessarily equate with increased skill in teaching.5 2
The Washington court's treatment of seniority suggests that perhaps
interpretation of WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.100 (Supp. 1975). Finding no public

policy argument in favor of continuous service, the court's decision was unanimous,
with Justices Brachtenbach, Stafford, and Utter commenting on the conflict between
school board and association powers under id. ch. 28A.72 and the limitations of id. §
28A.58.100 in concurring opinions. They noted that the board and the association believed that they had negotiated a binding agreement which they found to be "meaningless," 86 Wn. 2d at 502, 545 P.2d 1200, and suggested that the legislature amend

WASH. REV. CODE ch. 28A.72 (1974) making it "plain and certain that negotiations
thereunder are subject to every statute spread throughout RCW 28A and every court

interpretation thereof." 86 Wn. 2d at 502, 545 P.2d at 1200.
51.

84Wn. 2d 773,774,529 P.2d 810,812. See notes 20& 50 supra.

52. An example of how "seniority" may be unrelated to'meritorioui classroom
effort is the credit given, in terms of "experience," for years of military service. A
teacher who has taught ten years, and spent two more in the armed forces, ranks as
a teacher of 12 years experience on the salary schedule. Another who has taught for

ten years has less "seniority" although both have spent the same amount of time in
classroom work. To assume that the teacher at the twelfth step is a better teacher because of the seniority ratings and so more worthy of retention in a nonrenewal situation is a wooden and mechanical approach having no relation to the interaction
between human beings in the classroom.
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the legislature should enact a statute requiring that where layoffs are
necessary for economic reasons, the district must set forth express
standards to be used in nonrenewals and must also reveal how those
standards are applied to the nonrenewed teacher at the notice stage. A
more realistic but piecemeal course is being enacted now, as many districts seek to establish reduction in force policies through negotiations
with the teachers' professional organizations. In Pierce, unfortunately,
the Lake Stevens Educational Association declined to engage in negotiations for reduction in force policy, leaving the district free to resort
to earlier, and inadequate, criteria. The association missed an opportunity to improve those earlier subjective, imprecise, and discriminatory standards, leaving one of its teachers subject to the fatal combination of those faulty standards and the insufficiency of funds. Other
more farsighted districts and associations which have already developed policies have included seniority as one of several factors; other
determinations include affirmative action, program priorities, and
53
educational training.
53. Mr. Dean Little, counsel for the Bellevue Education Association, indicated
that by January 1976, Bellevue, Highline, Kent, and Shoreline school districts had
completed negotiations with their teacher associations for reduction in force policies.
Telephone interview with Dean Little, of LeSourd, Patten, Fleming, and Hartung.
Seattle, Wash. Jan. 19, 1976.
The Bellevue policy statement is typical. It outlines the School Board of Directors'
procedures and criteria to be followed if reduction in force is necessary "in the event
of significant revenue loss," providing for adjustments through modifying, reducing.
or eliminating programs and services. A priority of reduction statement outlines that
first to be cut back will be extended contracts, released time, and paid leaves of absence, then nonsalaried items such as books and supplies, followed by noninstructional
support services (maintenance, custodial operations, nonfunded transportation costs).
then central certificated instructional support services, instructional programs (which
touches the building teacher level), and finally those programs which are already
categorically funded and do not rely upon budgetary expenditures. The pertinent reduction here is that of certificated personnel at the building level; the document provides a separate section for that operation, mandating certain procedures.
Section 3. Staff Retention and Adjustment, indicates that first in order of staff
reduction will be teachers already over 65 years of age, who are teaching on a special
year to year basis. Certain specific objectives are to be maintained: the primary importance of the reduction effect upon the classroom, health and safety of students.
state and fec'eral statutes. Washington Administrative Code provisions, affirmative
action requirements, and the necessity to comply with state apportionment requirements and minimum state accreditation standards are all to be considered in each
reduction decision.
Criteria and procedures from Section 4 (Certificated Staff Reduction) determine
the actual mechanics. Staff are placed in position-seniority classes for which the person
is qualified (i.e., Class A, kindergarten through grade 6,Class B, seventh grade through
twelfth, and Classes C through L involving psychologists, counselors, special education staff, librarians, vocational education staff, and traffic safety personnel). Qualifications are defined by certification, minimum state requirements and, in administrative
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3.

Legislation-furtherlimitationson teachers'rights in the Pierce
vein

In March 1976, following renewed friction over continuing special
school levy failures coupled with demands for teacher accountability,
the Washington legislature passed Substitute House Bill 1364, which
substantially amended the existing statutory framework. 54 Strongly
opposed by the Washington Education Association, the new act significantly reduces teacher protections against nonrenewal and dis-

charge.

55

Procedural protections for new teachers were almost entirely removed, with the establishment of a one year probationary period
during which no right of appeal exists beyond that of an informal one
made to the 'superintendent of the district, and then to the school
board. 56 The "continuing contract" concept with employment limited
to a term of not more than one year by written order of a majority of
the board of directors was preserved, but teacher protections and safeguards against nonrenewal and discharge were particularly restricted
positions, by experience of at least one year. Persons may qualify for more than one
class.
Racial minorities and women administrators are exempt from involuntary termination or demotion, irrespective of seniority status. Other than that qualification, selection
of specific personnel for reduction is made pursuant to the district's seniority policy.
A tie-breaking mechanism for those whose seniority ratings fall on the same day is
provided by a lottery. The month and day of each person's birthdate is compared to
the order of lottery dates as drawn, and the person with the birthdate equivalent to
the lottery date drawn later in time shall have the lower seniority status.
Terminated employees are placed in a "recall" pool and are eligible for positions in
the categories for which they are qualified. Those in the recall pool are considered as
employees on leave of absence status. No one may be hired from outside this recall
pool unless there is no qualified person in the pool. Seniority controls in the order of
recall, as supplemented by Subsection 6.52 of the document. Ties are broken in the
same manner as is used in selection for reduction.
Assignments of personnel within the district are affected by reduction necessity,
and all certificated personnel then retained are considered unassigned with respect to
work location and specific job assignment, allowing the district to move personnel to
meet particular building needs.
The final section of the document indicates that the state law shall be followed at
all times in selecting persons for involuntary termination or adverse affect of contract, and that the Bellevue Education Association, bargaining agent for the district's
teachers, shall be fully apprised and informed throughout the selection process.
Bellevue School District & Bellevue Education Ass'n, Program, Service, and Staff
Adjustments Consistent With Assured Financial Resources, Jan. 29, 1976 (copy on
file with the Washington Law Review).
54. Ch. 114, [1975-76] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex.Sess. 327.
55. Developed and promoted by the Washington State School Board Directors
Association and the Association of Washington Businessmen, the bill was supported by
legislative forces traditionally conservative on the issue of teachers' rights.
56. Ch. 114, § 1, [ 1975-76] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 327.
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in the appeal process. 57 Both R.C.W. § 28A.67.070 and R.C.W. §
28A.58.450 were amended by the new bill to provide appeal only by
open or closed hearing available to employees receiving notice of discharge or an adverse change in contract status. There is no longer
provision for direct appeal to the superior court, except for nonrenewal under R.C.W. § 28A.58.450 or R.C.W. § 28A.67.070 for the
specifically stated reason of insufficient funds. 58 This limited appeal
does not apply to provisional teachers as defined in section 1 of the
bill, nor to any other cause for discharge or nonrenewal except finan59
cial.
Under the amended process, a hearing officer is appointed by representatives of the employee and the board, to act as judge during the
hearing before the board. The school board is thus in the jury role
while at the same time the board or its representative is also in a prosecutorial position. Provision is made for the board to elect, with the
employee's consent, the hearing officer that shall conduct the hearing
without board participation. In this event, the officer makes rulings as
to admissibility of evidence, issues of law, and matters of procedure,
transmitting to the board and the employee the findings of facts and
60
conclusions of law and the final decision.
As amended, R.C.W. §§ 28A.55.450 and 28A.55.480 provide
that the only appeal to superior court after a hearing must be without
a jury, and confined to verbatim transcripts of the hearings. Grounds
for reversal of board or hearing officer decisions are narrow: constitutionally violative decisions, decisions in excess of statutory authority
or jurisdiction of the board or officer, use of unlawful procedures, or
those decisions affected by errors of law or which are clearly erro61
neous, arbitrary or capricious.
The substantive impact of these changes is serious from the standpoint of teacher protections. First-year teachers are virtually unprotected, subject to dismissal by school boards for a variety of reasons
without any recourse on the teachers' part except for an informal con57. ld. § 5.
58. Id. § 8. Speaking in opposition to this revision of the existing statutes. Senator
Walgren (D. Bremerton) said: "'School boards tend to make decisions on an emotional basis . . . . A fair determination can be made only as a result of a court
appeal-an appeal that allows all evidence to be heard."' WEA [Washington Education Association] Action, March 1976, at 2,col. 3.
59. Ch. 114. § 8, [1975-76] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 327.
60. Id. § 5.
61.
Id.§ 6.
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versation with the superintendent.6 2 It is unlikely, once the board has
elected not to renew a teacher's contract, that such a decision will be
overridden by the superintendent.
Experienced teachers have lost the right to a direct appeal to superior court except for nonrenewal based on insufficient funds or levy
loss. All other discharges and nonrenewals must be appealed to the
board. Because it is the board which elects to nonrenew an employee,
the process of appealing to that board through the medium of the
hearing officer is an empty gesture since the board itself, already
committed to the employee's nonrenewal, then sits as jury on the appeal.
Most significantly, the very narrow grounds for direct appeal to
superior court-specifically stated reasons of insufficient fundsallow the board to operate behind a cover of other reasons, all of
which must be heard before the board first, rather than in the more
impartial courtroom setting..
The new legislation incorporates many of the Pierce court's attitudes, relied upon in reduction in force cases in the two years since
Pierce was decided. The delegation problem raised by the appellants
in Pierce now seems resolved by an amendment to R.C.W. §
28A.58.450, which allows the superintendent, rather than the school
board of directors, to determine probable cause, 63 as well as setting up
minimum criteria for evaluating professional performances. 64 The
principal, or the principal's designee, will evaluate all certificated personnel. 65 Thus the delegation of the sensitive evaluation process passes
into the hands of the building administrator or his designee, along
with its impact upon subsequent selection for nonrenewal or discharge. This codifies the Pierce court's decision on the issue.

62.

The provisional status of the teacher during his or her first year will further

reduce the possibility that he or she would be able to claim more than a "mere expectancy" in continued employment and thereby be entitled to accompanying 14th
amendment protections discussed in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Any consideration of this issue,
however, must now include the Court's recent opinion in Bishop v. Wood, 44 U.S.L.W.

4820 (U.S. June 10, 1976), in which the Court held in a 5-4 decision that whether a
public employee has a sufficient expectation of continued employment to constitute a
protected property interest under the due process clause is a matter of state law.
63.
64.

Ch. 114, § 2, [1975-76] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 327.
Id. § 3.

65.

Id.
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DELEGATION OF THE RIF DECISION

Appellants in Pierce contended that the Lake Stevens School Board
of Directors improperly delegated its decisionmaking authority to the
administrative staff, particularly the building principals, in violation
of R.C.W. § 28A.67.070. 66 The statute clearly indicates that it is the
task of the board of directors to determine which teachers are to be
nonrenewed and which are to be retained as employees of the district.
A.

Input of Building Principals

In Pierce the plaintiff faced the problem of ascertaining the degree
and extent of her principal's role in the board's final determination not
to renew her contract. The court stated that the actions of the building
principals represented a gathering of information and a making of
recommendations,6 7 but that the final judgment to renew or not renew
teachers' contracts was made by the board itself, utilizing those information gathering and recommending skills of the administrators. 68
Further, the court denotes this process as the "only practical manner"
by which the board could secure the information necessary for its determination, according that method the status of "universal practice." 69 The court's view compels a two-step determination of "cause":
66. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Every board of directors determining that there is probable cause or causes
that the employment contract of an employee should not be renewed by the district for the next ensuing term shall notify that employee in writing on or before
April 15th preceding the commencement of such term of that determination of the
board of directors, which notification shall specify the cause or causes for nonrenewal of contract.
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
67. 84 Wn. 2d at 784, 529 P.2d at 817.
68. This process is called "utilizing . . .the aid of subordinates." Id. at 783. 529
P.2d at 817, citing School Dist. 3 v. Callahan. 237 Wis. 560. 576. 297 N.W. 407. 415
(1941).
69. In effect, by such reasoning, the court implies that the "cause" of nonrenewal
is not the insufficiency of funds, except in a general sense, but that there were some
other undefined facts about Ms. Pierce that only her own building administrator, and
not the board, could provide. Hidden behind districts' reluctance to be more specific
than the Pierce standard is the elusive possibility that a district may find such lack of
specificity convenient for the periodic adjustment or removal of difficult personnel.
Every district has those who are misplaced, inefficient, inadequate, incompetent, or
superannuated, and the obscurity of such bare notice requirements as Pierce enables
districts to clean out those unwanted teachers when genuine financial necessity dictates.
They can be slipped out under the cover of economic necessity without recourse to
the other more noticeable and less politic discharge provisions of WASH. REV. CODE §
28A.58.450 (1974). As the Pierce court suggests. such lack of detail is a kindness to
the teacher, hinting that if pressed, the "real" (and presumably negative) reasons

888

Reduction in Force
the general one of insufficient funds at the district board level, and the
70
augmented specificity of individual building administrators.
B.

Delegation and Due Process

Even properly delegated authority does not involve uncontrolled
discretion or grant unlimited powers to the delegatee. The delegation
process7 1 is measured against procedural due process safeguards. Becould be disclosed. Apparently the "riffed" teacher should be grateful that if he or
she goes, it is without the stigma that a further and more insightful search might
develop. All this again shows that there is more to the "cause" than the financial needs
of the district. See notes 20-39 and accompanying text supra.
70. The court, however, noted that where the teacher has recourse to a hearing
and judicial review, the specific "causes" will eventually emerge, obviating the need to
offer detailed reasons in the nonrenewal notice. As long as review or hearing or trial
is provided, the 'specific reason (implying that there is something more detailed than
financial difficulties) will come out later. This makes a mockery of the hearing process
by making an adequate defense to the nonrenewal charges by the teacher impossible.
The teacher could not challenge criteria as yet unspecified by the school board.
71. The doctrine of delegation is based on the constitutional separation of powers
into three branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial); the primary responsibility for law-enforcing is designated to the executive branch, lawmaking to the
legislative branch, and law-deciding to the judicial branch. Delegation involves the
question of the extent to which these functions may be mixed, and to what extent
powers may be delegated, or transferred, from one branch to an administrative
agency.
In the school setting, the question becomes that of the extent to which the school
boards may delegate to their building administrators powers and duties reserved exclusively to the boards of directors by WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975).
The Washington State Legislature, in enacting id., conferred upon the school boards
of directors the power to determine probable cause If6r ionrenewal of teachers. Limitations may be imposed upon administrative authority by defining the grant of power
narrowly, thus characterizing such administrative action as ultra vires, beyond the
powers conferred. Another limitation found in case law is that "legislative power
. cannot be delegated.
United States- v. Shireveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
Despite the doctrine of nondelegability, Congress can and does lawfully delegate
power to administrative agencies. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381, 398 (1940). Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in
order that the exercise of legislative power does not become a futility. Only twice have
congressional delegations to public authorities failed. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.388 (1935). It is generally held that legislative bodies must state standards to guide
the application of delegated powers, and this doctrine is pivotal for upholding or invalidating delegation of authority. The standards test is often circumvented by applying the rule of permitting "filling up the details."
[I] t [the legislature] may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to
exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the general
legislative purpose; in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, "to fill up the details"; in the language of Chief Justice Taft "to make public regulations interpreting the statute and directing the details of its execution."
State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929,
941 (1928).
The law of nondelegation has more vigor in state courts than it has in federal
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fore being adversely affected in any final sense by delegated action of
an administrative process, the affected party must receive procedural
72
due process opportunities for review.
For teachers in Washington, such review is either by hearing, under
R.C.W. § 28A.67.070, or in the limited circumstance of a nonprobationary teacher where nonrenewal is based on financial reasons, by trial at the superior court level, as provided by R.C.W. §
28A.58.515. Thus, if the notice requirement were not adequately met,
or the right to a subsequent hearing denied, or the chance to challenge
adverse evidence not afforded, due process considerations could overturn the decisions of the authority to whom the power was delegated.
Such conditions were not present in Pierce.
One issue in Pierce involved discovering whether the board merely
sought advice and information from its administrators within each
building, or whether it had improperly delegated the statutorily defined and limited duty of "determining that there is probable cause or
causes that the employment contract of an employee should not be
renewed. . .'73 to its building administrators. Essentially, Pierce validates the procedure followed by the Lake Stevens board by finding
that authority specifically vested in the school board by the legislature
has not been improperly delegated to administrators in the district.74
The court, however, failed to consider that R.C.W. § 28A.67.070
may bar delegation of sensitive nonrenewal functions, and that such
delegation may challenge due process standards. The holding is contrary to a long line of authority as to the distinction between miniscourts. This is considered justified because "state legislatures much more than Congress
tend to delegate to petty officials who are authorized to act without adequate safeguards." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.07 (1958). It is the lack of safeguards

that surfaces in the Pierce situation, but the court there did not accept appellant's
delegation argument. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 26 (3d ed.
1972); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 58 (1974); L. JAFFE & N.
NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 33 (1968); G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 34 (1974). For a discussion of the distinction between

ministerial and discretionary duties and its impact on the delegation doctrine see
note 77 infra.
72. See note 32 supra. The broad discretion of school boards is limited by considerations of abuse of discretion, fraud, bad faith, and arbitrary and unreasonable
actions. E.g., Mullins v. Board of Educ., 249 Ala. 44, 29 So. 2d 339 (1947); Wilson
v. Board of Educ., 307 Ky. 203, 210 S.W.2d 350 (1948); State ex rel. Covell v. Board
of Educ., 73 Minn. 375, 76 N.W. 43 (1898). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT 26 (3d ed. 1972); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.01 et seq. (1958); L.
JAFFE & N.

NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 32 (1968).

73.

WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975).

74.

84 Wn. 2d at 784, 529 P.2d at 817.

890

Reduction in Force
terial and discretionary functions and constitutes short-sighted,
75
though expedient, policy.
C.

Ministerial-DiscretionaryDistinction

76
The early case of Johnson v. Sabine Parish School Board provides standards for delegation in the school setting. Standing squarely
on the general rule that legislative and discretionary powers of a
school board cannot be delegated, but that ministerial or administrative duties may be,77 Johnson held that the board and the board alone
must make the final determination of matters committed to its judgment and discretion.7 8 If tasks are committed to the board by statute,

then by implication the board may not delegate its authority to subordinate officers such as building principals, or to less than the whole

body.7

9

75. See note 77 infra.
76. 19 La. App. 243, 140 So. 87 (1932).
77. The distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties is that between
duties that involve little or no judgment or discretion (ministerial) and those that
require the exercise of independent judgment (discretionary). Certain tasks require a
minimum of decisionmaking, or the performance of the tasks may be so tightly controlled by the agency that no responsibility for decisionmaking is involved. Such tasks
are ministerial or administrative in nature and delegable, because they are so inherently controllable and rigidified. Other tasks call for a broad spectrum of decisionmaking and considerable latitude on the part of the decisionmaker; such duties are
discretionary and nondelegable. See Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens,
212 Cal. 607, 299 P. 728 (1931); Big Sandy School Dist. v. Carroll, 164 Colo. 173,
433 P.2d 325 (1967); Taggart v. School Dist., 96 Ore. 422, 188 P. 908 (1920). For
other cases utilizing the ministerial--discretionary distinction see NLRB v. Duval
Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1, 7 (1958); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
157 Ohio St. 574, 106 N.E.2d 642 (1952); Roehl v. Public Util. Dist., 43 Wn. 2d 214,
261 P.2d 92 (1953); State ex rel. R.R. Crow & Co. v. Copenhaver, 64 Wyo. 1, 184
P.2d 594 (1947).
78. Johnson involved specific performance on a contract or, in the alternative,
damages for breach; procurement of bus drivers was a discretionary exercise and thus
not delegable. The manner in which the parish board satisfied its transportation needs
was not spelled out by the statute, which empowered parish boards to provide transportation for school children, and thus was discretionary with the parish board. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that in committing the task to a particular board
member the board had improperly delegated its powers; the legal and discretionary
powers which the statute devolved upon the board as a whole might not be delegated
to the judgment of any of its individual members.
79. Big Sandy School Dist. v. Carroll, 164 Colo. 173, 433 P.2d 325 (1967), provides another illustration of improper delegation. By statute, both the power and the
duty to employ teachers were placed in the hands of the school board and such power
was not delegable to the superintendent of the district, unless the function were
merely administrative or ministerial in nature. The board had authorized the superintendent to contact and employ a teacher; the Colorado Supreme Court held that
the power to employ teachers and to fix their salaries was "exclusively vested," relying
on the wording of the Colorado statutory provisions. The Colorado statute read in
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Nothing in the Washington nonrenewal statute used the word
"duty," yet the phrasing "[e] very board of directors determining that
there is probable cause or causes that the employment contract of an
employee should not be renewed . . shall notify that employee
....,"80 made it explicitly the task of the school board, under the
continuing contract provision of R.C.W. § 28A.67.070, to handle
teacher discharge and renewal. The Washington statute allows involvement by no other agency in hiring and dismissing teachers.8 1 If a
board may not delegate up the ladder to allow its district superintendent to employ teachers, it would seem reasonable that it is also
precluded from delegating such a function down the chain of com82
mand.
pertinent part:
Every school board, unless otherwise especially provided by law, shall have
power, and it shall be their duty:
First-To employ or discharge teachers, mechanics and laborers, and to fix
allow and order paid their salaries ....
433 P.2d at 326 (emphasis in original), citing Ch. XCII, § 2496, [1877] Colo. Laws
823 (repealed 1964).
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975).
81.
It reads:
No teacher, principal, supervisor, superintendent, or other certificated employee.
holding a position as such with a school district, hereinafter referred to as "employee", shall be employed except by written order of a majority of the directors
of the district at a regular or special meeting thereof...
Id. See also id. § 28A.21.090 for general powers and duties of school boards of
directors.
82. The Washington Supreme Court has spoken extensively to the delegability
issue in Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wn. 2d 155. 500 P.2d 540
(1972). The trial court had held that an administrative regulation was invalid because
there was no statutory authority to promulgate fee schedules, and alternatively, if the
authority were delegated, it would be an improper and unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority without appropriate standards. Reversing, the supreme court
employed two rationales: (1) authority was delegated by WASH. REV. CODE §
19.31.070(1) (1974) to the administrative officers to approve fee schedules and establish listing of fees, as well as to issue rules and guidelines; (2) such delegation of
legislative authority is not unconstitutional nor is it without legislative standards.
The court held:
We are now convinced that, when described and limited in this manner, the requirement of specific legislative standards for the delegation of legislative power
is excessively harsh and needlessly difficult to fulfill. We hold that the delegation
of legislative power is justified and constitutional, and the requirement of the
standards doctrine are satisfied, when it can be shown (1)that the legislature has
provided standards or guidelines which define in general terms what is to be done
and the instrumentality or administrative body which is to accomplish it; and
(2) that procedural safeguards exist to control arbitrary administrative action
and any administrativeabuse of discretionarypower.
81 Wn. 2d at 159, 500 P.2d at 542-43 (emphasis in original). See also Caffall Bros.
Forest Products, Inc. v. State, 79 Wn. 2d 223, 484 P.2d 912 (1971); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968); Keating v. Public Util.
Dist., 49 Wn. 2d 761, 306 P.2d 762 (1957); Carstens v. DeSellem, 82 Wash. 643.
144 P. 934 (1914).
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In alleging improper delegation, appellants in Pierce relied upon
State ex rel. West v. Seattle.8 3 There a dismissed employee of the Seattle civil service contended that there was improper delegation since
her dismissal was effected not by the superintendent of the lighting
department but instead by the supervisor of personnel.8 4 Holding that
85
the rule was pro tanto void, the court stated:
But the power of an administrative agency to promulgate rules is not
unlimited. Under the guise of the rulemaking power it may not legislate and the rules must be within the framework of the policy laid
down in the statute or ordinance.
The Pierce court, however, distinguished West and held that there was
no evidence that the board had delegated its cause-finding powers,
and no rule to that effect was promulgated by the board. Instead, the
removal of Ms. Pierce was "done by formal act of the board as re'86
quired by law."
In Pierce the six criteria used by the Lake Stevens board "were
transmitted to the school administrative staff, who were told to select
27 teachers to be nonrenewed ....
,,87 In effect, the administrative
staff selected those teachers whose contracts would not be renewed.
The act of letter writing8 8 was accomplished by the school board itself; the act of selection for nonrenewal was done by administrators.
In School District 3 v. Callahan,8 9 relied upon by the Pierce court,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in a case involving consolidation of
school districts pursuant to a statutory requirement that such consolidation be made by the superintendent of schools, stated:9 0
However, the rule that requires an executive officer to exercise his
own judgment and discretion in making an order of such nature does
not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, the aid of subordinates directed by him to investigate and
83. 50 Wn. 2d 94, 309 P.2d 75I (1957).
84. Id. at 96, 309 P.2d at 752. According to SEATTLE, WASH. CHARTER, art. VII,
§ 8, the head of the city lighting department shall appoint and control all employees
of that department. Removal of an employee is authorized by the appointing power
only, that is, by the head of the lighting department in this instance. See id. § 4.
85. 50 Wn. 2d at 97, 309 P.2d at 753.
86. 84 Wn. 2d at 783, 529 P.2d at 816.
87. Id. at 774, 529 P.2d at 811.
88. Id., 529 P.2d at 812.
89. 237 Wis. 560, 297 N.W. 407 (1941).
90. Id. at 576, 297 N.W. at 415. The court further explained, "It suffices that the
judgment and the order finally made by the superintendent were actually his own; and
that there then attaches thereto the presumption of regularity ... ." Id.
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report the facts and their recommendation in relation to the advisability of the order ....
The Callahanaction is analyzed by the Wisconsin court as ministerial
in nature and thus delegable; the interpretation given to ministerial
duties here is not equivalent to the latitude, flexibility, and subjectivity
assumed by the Lake Stevens administrators. As suggested earlier,
ministerial and administrative duties are delegable; 91 those which are
discretionary in nature are not. Callahanillustrates that the characterization of a duty as ministerial (and thus delegable) rather than discretionary and nondelegable, may result in making a delegation
"proper." On this basis, if determination and notification of cause for
nonrenewal were characterized as a ministerial task, involving little
decisionmaking activity, they would be delegable functions. Appellants in Pierce did not raise this distinction between ministerial delegability and discretionary nondelegability.
D.

Subdelegation-The Fine Line Between Advice and Decision

In Ledgering v. State92 the Washington court held that the gathering, collating, and presentation of facts, as well as the making of recommendations required by an officer who is charged with a statutory
duty, "are without doubt delegable duties." 93 Delegation has been
upheld as valid when given to persons whose activities were advisory
in nature, because the director may still make his own decision rejecting the advice, thus retaining his independent judgment and discretion.9 4 There is a tenuous line between independent judgment and reliance upon that of the assistants; such a distinction is "difficult, if not
impossible to locate or define." 95 This same difficulty arose in the
Pierce context, in determining whether Pierce's nonrenewal was based
91. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
92. 63 Wn. 2d 94, 385 P.2d 522 (1963).
93. In this case, involving suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license, the
Washington Supreme Court held that such power was vested in the Director of the
Department of Licenses by WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.290 (1974). After agreeing
that such gathering, collating, recommending, and presenting of information might be
accomplished by assistants, the court held: "[T] he basic responsibility and authority
of exercising the discretion and power of decision . . . rests exclusively with the director." 63 Wn. 2d at 100, 385 P.2d at 526.
94. See, e.g., Finance Comm. v. Falmouth Bd. of Pub. Welfare, 345 Mass. 479.
188 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1963).
95. 63 Wn. 2d at 101. 385 P.2d at 526.
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on the independent judgment of the Lake Stevens School Board or

upon administrative information, suggestion, or recommendation.
Although Ledgering holds it is permissible to seek advice from subordinates, it does not clarify at what point the subordinates' advice
stops and the independent judgment of the director commences.9 6 The
court in Pierce minimized the degree of delegation as a rationale for
finding that redelegation or subdelegation is acceptable either as a
necessary or practical matter. 97 The large number of teachers in-

volved in reduction in force from levy failures compels districts to
make wholesale determinations of nonrenewability, when the customary experience had involved a small number of discharges each
year for cause. The Pierce court remarks on the practicality of
utilizing subordinates in this context, and again the ministerialdiscretionary distinction is relevant: activities of an administrative
or ministerial nature are delegable because a minimal degree of

decisionmaking is involved, or because the duty is labeled in a certain
98

way.

96. That other methods of defining or characterizing delegation are feasible is
apparent from the use of the decentralization concept in education. It is suggested
that a sort of voluntary delegation of the powers of the centralized school board
might be justified for three reasons: necessity (administrative convenience), insufficient
degree of delegation to violate the general principal of prohibited discretionary delegation, or an interpretation of delegation as part of the contractual relationship between the central and local school bodies. For a discussion of subdelegation in the
educational setting see Note, School Decentralization: Legal Paths to Local Control,
57 GEO. LJ. 992, 994-95 (1969).
97. Subdelegation is defined as the transmission of authority from the heads of
agencies to subordinates. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 215 (3d ed. 1972).

Congressional legislation in 1950 authorized the President to delegate to any officer
appointed with the advice and consent of the senate. 3 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (1970).
Subdelegation is now freely exercised in the federal courts. See, e.g., United States
v. Cottman Co., 190 F.2d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 903 (1952).
See also K. DAvIS, supra, at 215-17. Subdelegation was exercised in Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965), where the Secretary of State exercised power delegated to the
President to set up rules by which passports are granted or denied. By express statutory
authority to subdelegate, the Secretary of State may perform duties entrusted to him.
22 U.S.C. § 2658 (1970).
In the absence of express statutory provisions, the power of federal officers to subdelegate is less clear. In a state setting, in State v. Imperatore, 92 NJ.. Super. 347,
223 A.2d 498 (App. Div. 1966), the court held that the New Jersey Turnpike Authority could validly subdelegate to subordinates the power to set binding maximum
speed limits, below the general speed limits established by the Authority. See also
Note, Subdelegation by Federal Administrative Agencies, 12 STAN. L. REV. 808 (1960).
98. The court recently relied on Ledgering and Pierce in Smith v. Greene, 86 Wn.
2d 363, 545 P.2d 550 (1976), an action involving the denial of tenure to a community college instructor. The court held that consideration of recommendations
made by the district president and college president was not an improper delegation
by the board of trustees, even though the statutory framework, WASH. REV. CODE
Ch. 28B.50 (1974), provided only for consideration of the review committee's recommendation.
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Policy Implications

The Pierce court apparently ignored the peculiar circumstances
involved in widespread teacher nonrenewals. Although Ledgering involved reasonably objective details of license suspension, teacher nonrenewals involve subjective judgments made over a long period of
time by individual administrators, perhaps in several different places
of work. Further, the ongoing relationship between teachers and administrators is potentially much more abrasive than is a single encounter with a law enforcement officer over a traffic violation. In the
school setting, the accumulation of incidents over a period of years
lends a cumulative effect to the administrator's assessment of his
teacher.
As a practical matter, the school board cannot rely upon its own
judgment, particularly in a large district; it must depend upon the
input of its principals and administrators. Such discretion may be too
great,9 9 may involve inadequate bases for comparison among teachers, 10 0 and may ultimately result in the nonrenewal decision being
based entirely upon teacher-administrator personal relationships.' 0 '
99. Among the criteria adopted by the Lake Stevens board is this item: "That
within [this] framework the building principal shall consider the following human
factors: age, home, special problems, etc." 84 Wn. 2d 772, 774. 529 P.2d 810. 811
(1974). The built-in vagueness of those imprecise and undefined standards is staggering. The imprecision of "etc." in allowing for subjective and discretionary judgments by a building principal is a potential threat to the due process rights of the
teacher.
100. Selection of teachers to be nonrenewed is also based on a comparative analysis of those involved and their ability to conduct the particular programs which are
to be retained, rather than a comparison of each nonrenewed teacher with every
other teacher. Making only a brief reference to this argument. the court otherwise
dismissed what might have been the major and far-reaching equal protection issue
simply by stating that the trial court "did not err in rejecting this contention of the
appellants," because the teachers were compared with those teachers who were
qualified for the same positions. 84 Wn. 2d 772, 785, 529 P.2d 810, 817 (1974). The
court suggests such a procedure as Ms. Pierce requested would have been wasteful.
A similar but not identical contention was raised in Peters v. South Kitsap School
Dist., 8 Wn. App. 809, 509 P.2d 67 (1973). There the nonrenewed teacher
sought to have the district dismiss another teacher with less seniority in his own areas
of qualification to create a position and also to adjust other teaching assignments to
make room for him. Neither contention met with success. The appellants in Pierce
did not argue that they were better qualified for a particular position than a retained
teacher, nor was any authority for the necessity of such a district-wide comparison
offered. 84 Wn. 2d 772, 784-85, 529 P.2d 810, 817 (1974).
101. Before the advent of widespread special levy failures, principals did not
have to compile sufficient evidence to allow the school board to make independent
judgments necessary for reduction in force action. By its decision in Pierce the court
has, in the interest of expediency, removed the necessity of a board judgment, leaving
teachers without that safeguard and thus nearly entirely dependent upon the vitality
of their personal relationships with their administrators. Already the effects of this

896

Reduction in Force
The possibilities for administrative action which would rid buildings
of "troublemakers," the ability of the district to manipulate teachers
under the levy process, and opportunities for removing experienced
teacheri with higher salaries in favor of larger numbers of younger
teachers with lower salaries all loom in the wake of the Pierce decision; Pierce permits shifting of responsibility from the school board
102
itself to individual building personnel.
decision are evident, as in an original statement on the roles of principals in determining staff reduction.
"Building needs," as used by the Seattle School District as the primary determinative factors in rehiring those teachers "riffed" after the second levy failure in April
1975, see note 16 supra, is-an "ambigubois term whi6h indeed may mean just that:
strict attention to objective building requirements. It may also cloak subjective judgments of a personal, vindictive, or merely inaccurate nature. In any employeremployee relationship, the greatest single factor is the personal relationship between
the two; without objective guidelines, properly publicized, and some measure of accountability beyond that of a single administrator at the building level, the principal's
role becomes an all powerful one which may or may not truly reflect "building
needs" and the teacher's competency. Placing such critical decisionmaking powers in
the hands of a building administrator, rather than the school board of directors, does
not comport with the requirements of WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.67.070 (Supp. 1975),

despite the formality of the actual nonrenewal letter originating with the board.
Further, it compounds the dangers of specially delegated powers being stibdelegated
to subordinates over whose judgments there is little control and whose processes are
private. Chief Justice Hale, dissenting in Pierce, recognized these dangers:
Under the fog of that terminology, ["program considerations"] a senior teacher
could be dismissed by nonrenewal and a junior teacher retained for no better
reason than that a principal, director, or superintendent liked one teacher better
than another-and no one would be the wiser.
84 Wn. 2d at 790, 529 P.2d at 820. See also 1,000 Persons v. Seattle School Dist.,
No.795080 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County, Jan. 28, 1976).
102. For example, it was suggested by the appellant in Peters that, two years
prior to his actual nonrenewal, he was assigned to full time study hall work so that
his position could later be abolished and his employment terminated as soon as some
sort of excuse like financial need, presented itself. 8 Wn. App. 809, 815, 509 P.2d 67,
72. The court did not find the argument persuasive and dismissed the bad faith
possibilities inherent in such an action by a school board. Id. at 815, 509 P.2d at 72.
As a practical matter, however, school districts do often move unwanted or borderline teachers, building troublemakers, or those deemed ineffective or incompetent,
to less desirable positions or buildings with an eye toward moving them away or
making conditions sufficiently unpleasant so they will be persuaded to seek employment elsewhere. Such a course is often less noticeable and less disturbing to public
relations oriented school boards than formal dismissal charges.
It has been the author's personal experience in "off the record" conversations with
administrators to hear comments made that a teacher is being sent "down" to a junior
high school, from the preferred high school level, for example, to "move them along"
or to remove them entirely from the district. The author has also discussed with
administrators the feasibility of assigning a teacher to a less preferred subject matter
area (most teachers are qualified in two or three subjects) as a way to facilitate the
teacher's thinking that a move from the building might be desirable.
It is not uncommon for teachers to be punished for various infractions by not
getting the classes the teacher is known to prefer, or by the addition of certain onerous duties such as lunch room patrol, or bus loading details. Trade-offs occur between buildings within a district, in which principals will trade unwanted teachers to
another principal who can better utilize the teacher, in exchange for someone else's
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Allegations of dismissals based on adverse personal relationships
with administrators are difficult to sustain, for such maneuvers are not
documented but conducted along informal lines by district administrators. Under the conditions brought about by a reduction in force, with
large numbers of teachers subject to nonrenewal, teachers face lessened safeguards as more of the nonrenewal task falls to administrators within the building. The teacher is more vulnerable to individual
administrator judgments than to the relatively more objective and remote judgment of the school board.
III.

CONCLUSION

Pierce and subsequent decisions indicate that, in Washington, the
importance accorded seniority now approaches the importance that it
has been accorded by other jurisdictions. In all instances, seniority has
a recognized but not primary position: if district guidelines defining or
limiting the role of seniority in nonrenewal situations do exist, the
teacher may correctly assume that seniority will be a consideration;
however, the. reliance formerly placed upon seniority as a measure of
t 03
security in job retention has been significantly weakened.
School boards, faced with widespread teacher nonrenewals, may
utilize the factfinding and information gathering services of their administrators, while adhering to the letter more than the spirit of the
statutory provision that the board itself must make the final and ultimate determination. Board action is validated by stating the general
cause of nonrenewal, that is, insufficiency of funds, while entrusting
the specific board criteria to administrators for application to specific
nonrenewals. The danger in such a procedure is one of discerning
"square wheel." All this, of course, is contrary to most districts' negotiated policy
about assignments, and all of it is carried on informally, by telephone calls, or outside the school environment. This process generally goes on without the teacher's
knowledge; proving that such irregular proceedings have taken place is almost an impossibility.
103. In his dissent, Chief Justice Hale commented on the weakened position of
teachers:
Unless seniority be the major basis for retaining teachers having similar qualifications and teaching assignments, a teacher is without any tenure at all. He or
she may be discharged, i.e., nonrenewed, without any cause whatever, upon whim
or caprice, or even out of ill will under the blanket claim of economic necessity.
Without seniority, the teachers have nothing in cases of major personnel reductions ....
84 Wn. 2d at 795-96. 529 P.2d at 823.
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when the information gathering process stops and the independent
judgment of the board begins.
The decrease in significance of seniority as a criteria in job retention coupled with the delegation of selection of renewals to administrators deprives teachers of the statutory safeguard of board judgment
with its relative neutrality. Teachers must now depend instead upon
personal relationships with building administrators, for their professional evaluation as principals assume the intermediary, and perhaps
critical, role in nonrenewals.
That most sensitive of subjects, merit assessment, necessitates the
evaluation of teachers by administrators. It' is time for teachers and
districts to face-up to some sort of personnel evaluation on merit and
competence of teaching. In a profession where such pressing concerns
as personal neatness, bulletin board skills, and uniformity of gradebook records are involved in the evaluation process, it would seem
appropriate for professionals to accept some judgment upon their
teaching capabilities as well.
If districts and teachers do not achieve guidelines themselves, cases
as inconsistent as Thayer, Peters, Pierce, and Hill may either confound the issue further, or force the legislature to act by applying statutory requirements to reduction in force policies. Like the Lake Stevens association in Pierce, if districts and teachers refuse to handle
their responsibility, they leave the field open for another body to act,
one which lacks the inside knowledge and understanding of school
problems, and one which might well impose stricter or less sensible
standards than the teaching forces themselves could develop.
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